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LAW AND EQUITY IN THE FEDERAL COURTS.
By Earl C. Arnold*
(All italics used in quotations herein are those of the writer.)

The pleading which came into vogue under the common law
and equity systems has been modified gradually, following a working out of the plans originated by David Dudley Field. Not to exceed seven states now retain the pure common law system of pleading. Many jurisdictions have abolished all distinctions between law.
and equity. The result to the profession has been that a large part
of the time of the courts has been occupied with the interpretation
of statutes of technical import. To the law student it has resulted
in instilling a feeling that a study of the science of pleading as our
fathers understood it is a waste of time, for the next legislature
may abolish all the law of pleading which he knows. The effect
on both the profession and the student has been unfortunate, for
it has discounted the necessity for a foundation in the study of
the science of pleading which is necessary in any system. This impression may not be the fault of the code system itself as much as
its sponsors who convey the idea that the code sets up a new system,
unconnected with anything with which the world has yet been acquainted. The fact is that no code yet has abolished the necessity
for an intricate knowledge *of common law and equity pleading.
While in words a state constitution may, as many do, abolish all
distinctions between law and equity, the courts in construing various statutes of modern origin are compelled to resort to the musty
volumes which our forefathers cited as authority. For instance,
in such a state, if a petition for an injunction be filed, whether a
jury trial be permitted requires a determination of the fact that it
is in form an equitable action, and that in such cases no jury is
authorized. Abolition of the distinction between the forms of a
bill in chancery and the common law declaration has not obliterated
the essential and inherent distinctions between law and equity as
two separate sciences. What was an action at law before the adop*Professor of Law, University of Florila College of Law.
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tion of the code is yet an action founded upon legal principles.
What was a suit in equity before the code, is still an action founded
upon equitable principles.' No criticism or defense of the code
system is intended, but the mere statement of a fact, viz.: that the
code system has not abolished the necessity for the study of com.
mon law and equity pleading, but it has emphasized the importance of such study. The law schools must emphasize the procedural
courses more, and encourage the prospective lawyer to become
rooted in the science of pleading, if they expect to impress the community by the success of their graduates.
To prevent this article from assuming the length of an encyclopedia on the subject of pleading, it will be necessary to delimit the subject. The purpose is to impress one point, namely,
that neither legislation by the states or Congress, nor any'rule of
court, can abolish the distinction between common law and equity
pleading. While the two systems can be blended partially in the
state practice they remain separate and distinct in the Federal
courts until the people of the states, through an amendment to the
Constitution of the' United States, agree otherwise. Whether the
present Federal practice is wise or not is not within the purview
of the present discussion. With the readjustment of all things in
our reconstruction period it need not be unexpected if reformers
continue to suggest, as they have in the past, that the judicial sys2
tem be changed, carrying with it a reformation of pleading.
The judicial powe' of the United States has been vested in one
Supreme Court and such inferior courts as Congress, from time to
time, has established. 3 The only court in the United States which
could not be abolished except by the laborious method of submitting
the matter after a two-thirds vote of both houses of Congress to
the various states for affirmative vote by three-fourths of them, is
the Supreme Court of the United States. No Congress can affect
it. It is an independent department of government, secure from
'Sutherland's
Code Pleading and Practice, Sec. 87.
2
See article in the Journal of the American Judicature Society for December, 1918, by Judge Adolph J. Rodenbeck of the Supreme Court of New York,
on "Principles of Modern Procedure" in which he says: "There should be no
distinction in the form of an action in equity and at law."
sArticle 3, Section 1, Constitution of the United States.
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encroachment by any other department. In a like manner its jurisdiction can not be enlarged or contracted from that originally
authorized by the same instrument which established it. Among
other things, the section dealing with the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and inferior courts established by Congress declares
that:
"The judicial power shall extend to all cases, in Zaw and equity,
arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United States, and
treaties made, or which shall be made under their authority;
")4

In the seventh amendment, it is provided that:
"In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall
exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved,
and no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-examined in any
court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law."
In the eleventh amendment to the Federal Constitution it is
declared that:
"The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens of another state,
or by citizens or subjects of any foreign state."
What was the intention of our forefathers in writing into our
Constitution the sections to which reference has been made? Did
they intend to maintain a distinction between the terms italicized?
May Congress, by its fiat, abolish distinctions between actions at
law and equity recognized when our Constitution was written'?
Could we have a Federal code pleading system patterned after that
originated by David Dudley Field? The answer is that only the
people may remove the distinctions which for one hundred and
thirty years have been maintained between law and equity. In
each provision of the Constitution quoted above, law and equity
are distinctly and separately mentioned.
The legislative branch of our government passed, as one of its
first acts, this section, which is in effect today:
'Article 3, Section 2, Constitution of the United States.
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"The laws of the several states, except whiere the Constitution,
treaties or statutes of the United States otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at commn law,
in the courts of the United States, in cases where they apply.' '
Again, in 1872, Congress enacted that:
"The practi -. pleadings and forms and modes of proceeding
in civil causes, othc.r than equity and admiralty causes, in the circuit
and district courts, shall conform, as near as may be, to "the practice, pleadings and forms and modes of proceeding existing at the
time in like causes in the courts of record of the state within which
such circuit or district courts are held, any rule of court to the
contrary notwithstanding." 6
What is the effect of the two sections last quoted in view of
the codification in many states, and the general attempt to abolish
all distinctions between law and equity? In states like California
and New York, where the system of code pleading obtains, is it
not necessary to follow the same system in the Federal courts sitting in the same state ? The answer is in the negative, for which
ample support is found in the opinions written by various members
of the Supreme Court of the United States. No action of the state
can abolish the distinction between law and equity embodied in the
Constitution. However the states may blend the twc systems, they
can have no effect when the lawyer pleads in a Federal court.
Referring to the first of the acts above quoted, in holding that
an equitable .title could not be set up in defense of an action of
ejeetment in a Federal court, even if permissible in a similar action
in a state court in the same jurisdiction, the Supreme Court of the
United States approved this language a hundred years ago:
"By the laws of the United States the circuit courts have cognizance of all suits of a civil nature at common law, and in equity,
in cases which fall within the limits prescribed by those laws. By
the 34th section of the judiciary act of 1789 it is provided that the
laws of the several states, except where the Constitution, treaties
or statutes of the United States shall otherwise require or provide,
shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at common law in the
courts of the United States in cases where they apply. The act of
'Act September 24, 1789, Ch. 20, 1 St. at L. 92, R. S. 7 1.
'Act Tune 1, 1872, Ch. 256, 17 St; at L. 197, R. S. 914.
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May, 1792, confirms the modes of proceeding then used in suits
at common law in the courts of the United States, and declares
that the modes of proceeding in suits of equity shall be 'according
to the principles, rules and usages, which belong to courts of equity,
as contradistinguished from courts of common law,' except so far
as may have been provided for by the act to establish the judicial
courts of the United States. It is material to consider whether it
was the intention of Congress, by these provisions, to confine the
courts of the United States in their mode of administering relief to
the same remedies, and those only, with all their incidents, which
existed in the courts of the respective states. In other words,
whether it was their intention to give the party relief at law, where
the practice of the state courts would give it, and relief in equity
only, when according to such practice, a plain, adequate, and complete remedy could not be had at law. In some states in the union
no court of chancery exists to administer equitable relief. In some
of those states, courts of law recognize and enforce, in suits at law,
all the equitable claims and rights which a court of equity would
recognize and enforce; in others, all relief is denied, and such equitable claims and rights are to be considered as mere nullities of law.
A construction, therefore, that would adopt the state practice in all
its extent, would at once extinguish, in such states, the exercise of
equitable jurisdiction. The acts of Congress have distinguished
between remedies at common law and in equity, yet this construction would confound them. The court, therefore, think that to effectuate the purposes of the legislature, the remedies in the*courts
of the United States are to be, at common law or in equity: not
according to the practice of the state courts, but according to the
principles of common law and equity, as distinguished and defined
in that country from which we derive our knowledge of those principles. Consistently with this construction, it may be admited, that
where by the statutes of a state, a title, which would otherwise
be deemed merely equitable, is recognized as a legal title, or a
title which would be good at law, is under circumstances of an equitable nature declared by .uch statutes to be void; the rights of the
parties, in such a case, may be as fully considered in a suit at law
in the courts of the United States as they would be in any state
court."
Concerning section 914, supra, Chief Justice Fuller observed:
"Section 914 of the Revised Statutes in providing that the
practice, pleadings, and forms and modes of proceeding in civil
causes, in the circuit and district courts, shall conform, as near as
'Robinson v. Canpbrell, 3 Wheaton 212.
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may be, to the practice, pleadings and forms and modes of proceeding existing at the time in like causes in the courts of record
of the state within which such circuit or district courts are held,
in terms excludes equity causes therefrom, and the jurisprudence
of the United States has always recognized the distinction between
law and equity as under the Constitution matter of substance, as
well as of form and procedure, and, accordingly, legal and equitable
claims cannot be blended together in one suit in the circuit courts
of the United States, nor are equitable defenses permitted." s
The decisions of our highest court are uniform to the effect
that the state cannot adopt any system of procedure failing to distinguish between common law and equity and thus bind the courts
established under the authority of the Constitution of the United
States. Lawyers have argued to that tribunal that the sections
quoted authorize the adoption by the Federal courts of systems of
code pleading in force in various states. In answer to this contention, Chief Justice Taney, speaking for the Supreme Court, said:
"The common law has been adopted in Texas, but the forms
and rules of pleading in common law cases have been abolished,
and the parties are at liberty to set out their respective claims and
defenses in any form that will bring them before the court. And
as there is no distinction in its courts between cases at law and
equity, it has been insisted in this case, on behalf of the defdn-dant in error, that this court may regard the plaintiff's petition
either as a declaration at law or as a bill in equity.
"Whatever may be the laws of Texas in this respect, they do
not govern the proceedings in the courts of the United States. And
although the forms of proceedings and practice in state courts have
been adopted in the District Court, yet the adoption of the state
practice must not be understood as confounding the principles of
law and equity, nor as authorizing legal and equitable ulaims to be
blended together in one suit. The Constitution of the United States,
in creating and defining the judicial power of the general government, establishes this distinction between law and equity; and a
party who claims a legal title must proceed at law, and may undoubtedly proceed according to the forms of practice in such cases
in the state court. But if the claim is an equitable one, he must
proceed according to the rules which this court has prescribed (under the authority of the act of August 23. 1842), regulating proceedings in equity in the courts of the United States."0
8Scott v. Armstrong, 146 U. S. 499, 512.
"Bennett v. Butterworth, 11 Howard 669.
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Distinction must be made, therefore, between the substantive
law of a state and its procedural law. The Federal Courts are
directed to follow the laws of the several states in trials at common
law unless otherwise provided. They cannot follow the particular
practice of the state courts in equity suits. In law actions, Congress evidently intended the laws of the state to be followed only
so far as it related to their substantive law.
Various states have adopted the code system, and the Supreme
Court of the United States has had many opportunities to consider cases arising in code states. The code system did not meet
with much favor from that body originally. The Federal Courts
have guarded jealously against the restraint of their jurisdiction
by state action. Mr. Justice Grier, in 1860, gave expression to the
feelings held by the members of the early court for the code system, which sought to abolish all distinctions between law and equity.
He said:
"We had occasion already to notice the consequences resulting
from the introduction of this hybrid system of'pleading (so called),
into the administration of justice in Texas. . .
. This case adds
another to the examples of the utter perplexity and confusion of
mind introduced into
the administration of justice, by practice
0
under such codes."'
A section of the Judiciary Act provides that:
"Suits in equity shall not be sustained in any court of the
United States in any case where a plain, adequate and complete
remedy may be had at law.""
That this section is merely declaratory of the common law is
conceded. In form it is positive and prohibitive, and prevents a
modification of constitutional rights by judicial enlargement. Not
only has the defendant a constitutional right to a trial by jury,
but in addition this act of Congress prohibits a party aggrieved
from pursuing his remedy in a court of equity if he has an adequate
remedy at law.' 2 In effect it maintains. those clear distinctions between the two forms which were emphasized at the time the Judiciary Act was written. But, by what standard are we to determine
what is meant by "a plain, adequate, and complete remedy" at
'*Green v. Custard, 23 Howard 484.
"Act September 24, 1899, Ch. 20, 1 St. at L. 82, R. S. 723.

"Scott v. Neely, 140 U. S. 106.
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law? Is not this language a loophole by which the meaning may be
different from that understood by the writers of the act? May
not the state enlarge the meaning of an adequate remedy at law
from that understood at common law? The courts have jealously
guarded the provision quoted. The meaning of "a plain, adequate,
and complete remedy" at law is the same as when the Constitution
was written, unless since changed by acts of Congress. Neither
practice of the state courts nor state legislation can affect this interpretation, for as the Supreme Court of the United States said:
"The adequacy or inadequacy of a remedy at law for the protection of the rights of one entitled upon any ground to invoke the
powers of a Federal court is not to be conclusively determined by
the statutes of the particular state in which suit may be brought.
One who is entitled to sue in the Federal circuit court may invoke
its jurisdiction in equity whe-viever the established principles and
rules of equity permit such a suit in that court; and he cannot be
deprived of that right by reason of his being 13allowed to sue at law
in a state court on the same cause of action.'
The statutes mentioned are but a recognition of the distinctions
maintained in the Constitution of the United States. Those demarcations between baw and equity must exist until the people, in
the only modes by which the Constitution can be amended, see fit to
change the provisions. Until the Constitution is changed, the Federal Court is the only tribunal in our country having uniformity
of practice and procedure in all the states. 14 The result is that no
applicant is fitted for the bar until he becomes acquainted 'with the
fundamentals of procedure at common law and equity. No practitioner can properly conduct a case in the Federal Court without
a clear understanding of the difference between the two systems of
pleading. The distinction confronts him from the filing of the
first pleading and determines its entire course. No matter how
artful the state has been to make changes which will affect proceedings of a Federal Court sitting in that state, such courts are
independent, and in filing an action therein the lawyer, if he desires success to crown his efforts, must become intimate with law
and equity, not only as substantive law, but also as systems of
pleading as such existed at the time of the revolution.
13Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466, 616.
"Simkins, "A Federal Equity suit," p. 5.

